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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TAYLOR R. DOBSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 46078-2018
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR-2016-20308

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ms. Dobson appeals from the district court’s Order of Probation on Withheld Judgment.
She asserts the district court abused its discretion when it withheld judgment and placed her on
probation but suspended her driver’s license for five years after she pleaded guilty to one felony
count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In October of 2016, Canyon County Sheriff’s Deputy Roberts responded after a caller
reported there was a vehicle sitting in an intersection with a turn signal activated, which was not
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moving. (Presentence Report (PSI), pp.2-3.)1 When Deputy Roberts arrived on the scene, he
saw a car parked on the shoulder and noted that the license plates matched those the caller had
reported. (PSI, p.3.) When he approached the car, Deputy Roberts saw a woman “slouched over
the middle console, laying across the car, resting her head on the passenger seat.” (PSI, p.3.)
When he knocked on the window, the woman did not respond but asked for help after Deputy
Roberts attempted to wake her again. (PSI, p.3.) When he opened the door, he could smell
alcohol. (PSI, p.3.) The woman was wearing a hospital wrist band, and Deputy Roberts saw that
her name was Taylor Dobson. (PSI, p.3.) When he asked her if she needed help, she said she
did because she had hit her head. (PSI, p.3.) Deputy Roberts said Ms. Dobson explained she
had brain surgery three months prior, but she had hit her head again recently due to a fall, so she
had to go back to the hospital. (PSI, p.3.) He said Ms. Dobson did not know where she was or
how she got there. (PSI, p.3.)
Subsequently, medical personnel arrived and transported Ms. Dobson to a hospital. (PSI,
p.3.)

Another officer on scene saw a half-empty bottle of alcohol on the passenger side

floorboard. (PSI, p.3.) After Ms. Dobson was treated, Deputy Roberts asked Ms. Dobson if she
had been drinking, and she said she had been. (PSI, p.3.) A blood draw showed Ms. Dobson’s
blood alcohol level was .2865. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Dobson said she had an alcohol problem and
needed help. (PSI, p.3.) In her statement for the PSI, she acknowledged she was driving under
the influence, and she had two prior DUIs. (PSI, p.4.) In regard to this incident, she stated she
was having car trouble, which made it difficult to change gears. (PSI, p.4.) Therefore, she
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 77-page electronic document, which in addition to the PSI,
contains other relevant sealed documents.
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pulled to the side of the road but hit her head when she did so. 2 (PSI, p.4.) She said her cell
phone battery was dead, so she decided to wait until morning, and she then drank from a bottle of
alcohol she had in the car and ultimately fell asleep. (PSI, p.4.)
Ms. Dobson was charged with one felony count of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. (R., pp.24-25.) An Information Part II was also filed alleging that the
instant offense was Ms. Dobson’s third driving under the influence charge within ten years.
(R., pp.26-27.) Ms. Dobson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (3/27/18 Tr., p.9, L.25
– p.12, L.8; R., pp.38-55.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose a
sentence of six years, with two years fixed, but retain jurisdiction. (6/4/18 Tr., p.5, L.19 – p.11,
L.14.) Defense counsel noted this was an unusual case in that Ms. Dobson was not aware a
complaint had been filed, or an arrest warrant had issued, for approximately one year after the
incident. (6/4/18 Tr., p.11, L.18 – p.12, L.3.) In light of the fact that, among other things,
Ms. Dobson told her misdemeanor probation officer3 about this incident right away and sought
treatment independently, counsel requested that the district court backdate the statutorily
mandated one-year license suspension, place Ms. Dobson on probation for three years, withhold
judgment, and allow Ms. Dobson to drive with an “interlock device.” 4 (6/41/8 Tr., p.14, L.10 –
p.20, L.11.)
The district court said it was not aware of authority that would allow it to backdate a
license suspension, and it asked the State whether it was aware of any. (6/4/18 Tr., p.20, L.21 –
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At the change of plea hearing, Ms. Dobson said she hit her head on the steering wheel when her
car hit a pothole. (3/27/18 Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.13, L.9.)
3
Ms. Dobson was on misdemeanor probation for petit theft, and she successfully completed
probation in March of 2017. (6/4/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-20.)
4
See I.C. § 18-8005(6)(e).
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p.21, L.6.) The State said it was not, but it would not object to the court doing so as it thought
that absolute license suspensions can make it harder for probationers to succeed.

(6/4/18

Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.11.) Ultimately, however, the district court withheld judgment, placed
Ms. Dobson on probation for five years, and suspended her driver’s license for five years.
(6/4/18 Tr., p.20, L.21 – p.23, L.22 – p.28, L.25; R., pp.57-59.) Ms. Dobson filed a notice of
appeal timely from the district court’s Order of Probation on Withheld Judgment. (R., pp.65-67.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it suspended Ms. Dobson’s driver’s license for
five years following her plea of guilty to one count of felony driving under the influence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Suspended Ms. Dobson’s Driver’s License For
Five Years Following Her Plea Of Guilty To One Count Of Felony Driving Under the Influence
Based on the facts of this case, Ms. Dobson’s five-year driver’s license suspension is
excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a claim
that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct “an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In
such a review, the Court “considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion
is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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Unless it appears that the sentence is “necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution,” the sentence is unreasonable. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8. When a sentence is
excessive “considering any view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Ms. Dobson’s five-year license
suspension is unreasonable. First, this was Ms. Dobson’s first felony conviction. (PSI, pp.4-5.)
This is a long-recognized mitigating factor. See e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
Second, Ms. Dobson accepted responsibility for this offense and recognized that alcohol is a
problem for her. In her statement for the PSI, she said, “I broke the law by operating a vehicle
under the influence. I have two prior DUI charges (2008, 2009) making this offense my third
offense.” (PSI, p.4.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, she acknowledged she had prior DUI
charges and told the district court she had struggled with alcohol for a long time, but she wanted
to “stay healthy and get healthy,” so she could watch her son grow up and “raise him as a sober
person.”5 (6/4/18 Tr., p.21, L.17 – p.22, L.5.) Acceptance of responsibility is also a recognized
mitigating factor. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982).
Additionally, multiple letters of support were submitted to the district court that show
Ms. Dobson’s family and employer support her, and that she is a hard worker who is employed
full-time. (PSI, pp.29-34.) For example, her mother wrote that she loved Ms. Dobson very
much and wanted her to beat her alcohol addiction. (PSI, p.31.) She also said Ms. Dobson had
“always taken responsibility for her actions,” and she and Ms. Dobson’s father would “accept
nothing less.” (PSI, p.31.) She noted that Ms. Dobson had always paid her own debts and kept a
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Ms. Dobson has a five-year-old son, and she shares custody. (PSI, p.10.)
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positive attitude. (PSI, p.31.) She went on to write that she had “seen a lot of growth” in
Ms. Dobson in the year prior to her sentencing, and that Ms. Dobson had sought treatment on her
own and “checked into a long term rehab” facility. (PSI, p.31.) She also said she appreciated
that Ms. Dobson could wear an alcohol monitor and drive herself to work; she explained that this
allowed “her to maintain her financial responsibilities,” make “it to her appointments and rehab,”
and spend “time with her son.” (PSI, p.31.)
Ms. Dobson’s aunt, Heidi Reilly, also wrote a letter of support. (PSI, pp.33-34.) She
stated Ms. Dobson “showed amazing organizational skills and a generous spirit” as a child, and
“[a]s she matured, she combined those skills, with her strong work ethic to take on new
responsibilities and she easily excels at any task or job to which she commits.” (PSI, p.33.)
Ms. Reilly also stated Ms. Dobson was a loving mother and wrote, “[I]t is clear that she has a
great way with children and that her son is benefitting from her supportive, fun loving and
unselfish spirit.” (PSI, p.33.) She went on to write that Ms. Dobson had “always been one to
own her missteps, mistakes and poor decisions and I believe she now understands that those poor
decisions are a result of an alcohol addiction and that the only way to ensure she can continue to
make positive decisions is through sobriety.”

(PSI, p.33.)

Ms. Reilly acknowledged that

Ms. Dobson’s alcohol addiction caused her to make poor choices but said Ms. Dobson “has
taken her strong work ethic to therapy and rehabilitation and worked on the issues that she may
have been unaware were triggers in her earlier years. Now with her maturity and very clear
understanding of the consequences that alcohol plays in her life and her son’s, I am confident she
will continue to place the highest importance on sobriety.” (PSI, p.34.)
Additionally, the Human Resources Director at Zamzows wrote a letter on Ms. Dobson’s
behalf. (PSI, p.30.) She stated that Ms. Dobson was a full-time employee of the company, and,

6

“despite the physical demands of” the job, Ms. Dobson had exceeded their expectations. (PSI,
p.30.) She also said Ms. Dobson showed up to work on time and worked “exceptionally well
with her co-workers.” (PSI, p.30.) She also wrote that Ms. Dobson had been “honest and up
front” with her and the store manager about her issues, and that she would “love to continue to
have [Ms. Dobson] be a long-term employee of Zamzows,” as she felt Ms. Dobson would
“continue to excel and have opportunity for growth within our organization.” (PSI, p.30.)
Defense counsel also told the district court that Ms. Dobson had recently been promoted at
Zamzows. (6/4/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-23.) The support of family and employers, as well as a
defendant’s positive work history should also be considered as mitigating sentencing
information. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had
the support of his family and his employer); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90-91 (1982).
Ms. Dobson has also struggled with both physical and mental health issues.
experienced a “brain bleed” in 2016 and has some memory loss as a result.

She

(PSI, p.12.)

Additionally, she has a history of depression, anxiety, and ADD, for which she receives
treatment and is prescribed medication. (PSI, pp.16, 19.) The mental health evaluator noted
that, without some form of treatment for these issues, Ms. Dobson would “continue to struggle
with symptoms,” and the “problems may increase.” (PSI, p.19.)
In light of all the mitigating information in this case, Ms. Dobson’s five-year license
suspension was excessive because it was not necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.
The district court focused on the protection of society. (6/4/18 Tr., p.24, L.2 – p.25, L.17.) It
also stated that one of the terms of Ms. Dobson’s five-year period of probation would be that she
not consume alcohol. (6/4/18 Tr., p.29, Ls.13-15.) In discussing Ms. Dobson’s driver’s license
suspension, it said there was “no other mechanism available to me that can protect the other
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people in society that you endanger by driving under the influence.” (6/4/18 Tr., p.28, L.22 –
p.29, L.5.) However, it did not consider whether an ignition interlock device on her car—or a
combination that device and a “SCRAM” bracelet,6 which would ensure she was not drinking on
probation—could achieve that goal after the required one-year license suspension.

If

Ms. Dobson was required to use these devices, society would be protected, and she could drive
to work and various appointments. She could also drive her son to school and other events,
which will inevitably become more frequent as he grows up.
The district court considered the fact that Ms. Dobson shared custody of her son as a
mitigating factor and said it did not want to impose a prison sentence because it wanted to help
Ms. Dobson “continue to me a mom and continue to be [in her son’s] life. (6/4/18 Tr., p.26, L.25
– p.27, L.10.) But it did not adequately consider how a long-term license suspension such as this
could make it very difficult for a working single mother to succeed. Indeed, even the State
acknowledged that “sometimes what we do is we make it harder to for probationers to be
successful when we absolutely suspend their license.” (6/4/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.) Given the
facts of this case, and the reasonable alternative measures available to ensure society was
protected, the district court abused its discretion when it suspended Ms. Dobson’s driver’s
license for five years because it did not reach its decision to do so through an exercise of reason.

6

Defense counsel noted that Ms. Dobson’s probation officer required her to wear this type of
alcohol monitoring device after this incident. (6/4/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-18.)
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Dobson respectfully requests that this Court reduce the duration of her driver’s
license suspension as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of January, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

RPA/eas

9

